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Preface
It is common for criminal law scholars from outside the United States to dis-
cuss the “American rule” in order to compare it to the rule of other countries.1 
As this volume makes clear, however,  there is no such  thing as an “American 
rule.” Each of the states, plus the District of Columbia and the federal system, 
have their own criminal law;  there are 52 American criminal codes.
American criminal law scholars know this, of course, but they too commonly 
speak of the “general rule” as if it reflects some consensus or near consensus 
position among the states. But the truth is that the landscape of American crim-
inal law is one of almost endless diversity, with few, if any, areas in which  there 
is a consensus or near consensus. Even most American criminal law scholars 
seem to fail to appreciate the enormous diversity and disagreement among 
the 52 American jurisdictions.
The best one can do in most instances is to talk of a “majority rule,” but 
even this is extremely difficult business.  Every jurisdiction recognizes a per-
son’s right to defend himself or herself against unlawful force, for example. 
But what is the “majority rule” in the United States in the formulation of that 
defense? Jurisdictions disagree on a wide variety of issues within self- defense, 
most prominently: (a) What constitutes the “unlawful force” that triggers a 
right to use defensive force? (b) What temporal requirement must be met for 
an actor’s conduct to be truly “necessary” at that time? (c) What amount of 
force may be used? (d) When may deadly force be employed? (e) When may 
an initial aggressor claim self- defense? (f) What is the  legal effect, if any, of 
the defendant provoking the encounter? (g) What is the  legal effect of mutual 
combat on self- defense? (h) Is  there a right to resist an unlawful arrest? (i) Is 
 there a duty to retreat from unlawful aggression before using deadly force? 
 There is disagreement among the states on  every one of  these issues.2
Further, as some of us have demonstrated elsewhere, even when the 
research is done, it is not so easy to construct the majority American rule. To —-1
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continue with the self- defense example above, not only do American juris-
dictions disagree on each of the self- defense issues listed above, but the pattern 
of states making up the majority view on each individual issue varies from 
issue to issue. In other words, at the end of the day the “majority rule” for self- 
defense in the United States is a rule that no jurisdiction actually adopts. 
It is necessarily a composite of the American “majority rule” on each of the 
sub- issues.3
Unfortunately,  there has been  little work done to map the enormous diver-
sity among the states, perhaps  because it is an extremely burdensome proj ect, 
in part for the reasons just noted.  Every  legal issue requires a major research 
proj ect investigating the criminal codes and/or case law of all 52 American 
jurisdictions, and a single  legal doctrine may have a half- dozen sub- issues 
that must each be separately resolved.
Although the paucity of such diversity research is understandable, it is 
nonetheless regrettable, for it is the  matters of disagreement that often point to 
the most in ter est ing issues for scholars. Why is it that  there is disagreement 
on a par tic u lar point? Why  hasn’t a consensus formed? What are the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the each of the alternative positions such that none 
have won the day? Or, is it that the alternative positions have been perpetu-
ated simply out of an ignorance by the legislatures of the disagreements among 
the states? That is, does diversity exist not  because of genuine disputes about 
which position is best but rather  because the conflicting positions are not 
readily known?
This volume is meant to raise awareness of the enormous diversity among 
the states on issues across the criminal law landscape, to document this diver-
sity with a host of specific illustrations on a wide range of issues, to encour-
age criminal law scholars to investigate  these and the many other points of 
disagreement that exist among the states, and to encourage each legislature to 
look to this new diversity scholarship and to the positions taken by other states 
when the legislature sets out to codify or recodify its criminal law (or to 
encourage judges to do the same in  those jurisdictions that continue to allow 
judicial criminal law making4).
In each of the next 38 chapters, we examine dif fer ent areas of American 
criminal law and identify the major groupings among the states on an issue 
in each area. This is hardly a comprehensive list of the issues on which  there are 
disagreement; it is only a representative sampling. Indeed, we know of no 
area of American criminal law on which  there is not disagreement among 
the jurisdictions. The only American criminal law universal is its universal 
diversity.
Nor are the points of disagreement that we map  here the only points of 
diversity within each of the issues that we examine. On the contrary, we 
commonly pick one par tic u lar point of disagreement among the states that -1—
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seems particularly in ter est ing or impor tant, but it is commonly only one of 
many points of interstate disagreement relating to that aspect of criminal law.
For the issue that we take up in each chapter, we group all the American 
jurisdictions according to the position they take. However,  there is such vari-
ety in approach that even jurisdictions within the same group commonly 
take slightly dif fer ent approaches (which we often attempt to document in the 
Notes). Thus, even our groupings of states, usually three to seven groups on 
each issue, understate the extent of American criminal law diversity.
Each chapter provides a map of the United States with each of the states 
visually coded according to its approach to the issue.  These maps, the reader 
 will see, often raise in ter est ing hypotheses about geographic or other state 
 factors that might explain the patterns of agreement and disagreement (red 
states versus blue states, rural versus urban, rich versus poor, West Coast ver-
sus East Coast,  etc.). At the end of each chapter we sometimes speculate about 
the reasons for disagreements, but more importantly, our hope is that the 
maps  will pique the interest of scholars in many disciplines— political scien-
tists, criminologists, criminal law scholars, and sociologists, among  others—to 
investigate alternative hypotheses about why we see the patterns of agree-
ment and disagreement that we see.
Notes
 1. For instance, it is common to speak of the “American rule” concerning the 
duty to rescue and criminal liability for omissions. See, e.g., Peter M. Agulnick 
and Heidi V. Rivkin, Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue: A Brief Survey of French 
and American Law, 8 Touro Int’l L. Rev. 93, 95 (1998) (referring to the “American 
rule” that  there is no duty to rescue); Christopher H. Schroeder, Two Methods for 
Evaluating Duty to Rescue Proposals, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1986, at 181 
(same); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 423, 424 (1985) (same). Likewise, it is common to speak of an “Amer-
ican rule” in the context of the duty to retreat. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Any Which 
Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes  toward Vio lence in the Evolution 
of the Anglo- American “Retreat Rule,” Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1992, at 303, 
305 (referring to the “American rule” that a person has the right to “stand [her] 
ground”); Jeannie Suk, The True  Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self- Defense, 31 
Harv. J. L. & Gender 237, 243 (2008) (same); Joseph E. Olson and David B. Kopel, 
All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition in  England and Some Lessons 
for Civil Liberties in Amer i ca, 22 Hamline L. Rev. 399, 465 (1999) (same). The phrase 
is often invoked by the courts. In the duty to retreat context, see, e.g., Cooper v. 
United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. 1986) (noting that jurisdictions which 
follow the “American rule” permit a person to “stand [her] ground”) and Gillis v. 
United States, 400 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C. 1979) (same). —-1
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 2. Paul H. Robinson, Matthew Kussmaul, Camber Stoddard, Ilya Rudyak, 
and Andreas Kuersten, The American Criminal Code: General Defenses, 7 J. Legal 
Analysis 37, 51–57 (2015).
 3. For a statement of such a majority rule for self- defense, see Robinson 
et al., supra note 2, at 50.
 4. See Chapter  4, concerning the legality princi ple, for a list of such 
jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER ONE
Distributive Princi ples of 
Criminal Law
What do we seek to achieve by imposing criminal liability and punishment? 
What princi ples should govern?  These may seem like academic questions, but 
they are not. One cannot rationally and thoughtfully draft or interpret a crimi-
nal code, draft sentencing guidelines, or impose a criminal sentence without 
knowing the answers to  these questions. A drafter of criminal code or sentenc-
ing guidelines must make hundreds if not thousands of choices in formulat-
ing criminal law rules, and sentencing judges must make a large number of 
discretionary judgments in determining the amount and method of punish-
ment to impose in a given case. And each of  these decisions can be affected by 
the princi ple that the criminal justice system has  adopted for distributing 
criminal liability and punishment.
Should criminal liability and punishment rules be set to match an offend-
er’s moral blameworthiness for the offense— his just deserts? Or should they 
be set to maximize the general deterrent effect of a criminal sentence on other 
potential offenders? Or should liability and punishment be set according to 
 whether this offender  will be dangerous in the  future and seek to incapacitate 
him or her during the time of greatest dangerousness?
Which of  these princi ples a jurisdiction adopts as its guide in imposing 
criminal liability and punishment  will have a dramatic effect  because each of 
 these alternative princi ples  will generate a quite dif fer ent distribution. Each 
 will impose a dif fer ent amount of criminal liability and punishment on a dif-
fer ent set of  people. Consider two examples.
Should a jurisdiction adopt an insanity defense? If incapacitating danger-
ous offenders is the criminal law’s primary goal, then it certainly should not 
have such a defense  because the  people shown to be dangerously mentally ill 
—-1
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Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law 5
are exactly the  people over which the criminal justice system wants to take 
control. Punishing insane offenders would also send a useful general deterrent 
message to other (noninsane) potential offenders, demonstrating how serious the 
system is about punishing violators. A desert princi ple, in contrast, would 
insist on exculpating offenders whose insanity renders them blameless.1
Another example illustrates that while deterrence and incapacitation princi-
ples may agree on the insanity defense issue, they commonly disagree with 
one another. Where an attempt fails by chance— the intended victim bends 
down to tie his shoe at the moment before the assailant’s bullet is about to 
strike his head— the incapacitation princi ple would punish the failed attempt 
the same as a successful attempt  because the assailant is equally dangerous 
in both cases, while a deterrence princi ple would want to punish the attempt 
less seriously than the completed offense so as to maintain a continuing threat 
of additional punishment to deter a follow-up attempt. If the failed attacker is 
already fully liable, why  wouldn’t he try again?
If desert  were the distributive princi ple in the attempted murder case, it is 
unclear what the result would be  under deontological desert: moral phi los o-
phers are divided over  whether the resulting death should increase the actor’s 
punishment where his conduct and culpability are identical. On the other 
hand,  under what one might call “empirical desert,” the result is clear: ordi-
nary  people essentially universally agree that the resulting harm should 
increase punishment, that murder should be punished more seriously than 
attempted murder.
 There are hundreds of issues like the insanity defense and the significance 
of resulting harm about which alternative princi ples differ in their distribu-
tion of criminal liability and punishment.
 Every jurisdiction in the United States, through constitutional provision, 
statutory provision, state sentencing commission policy, or appellate court 
opinion, gives some indication of the princi ple or princi ples that should be 
used in constructing, interpreting, or applying its criminal liability and sen-
tencing rules.2 States are  free to adopt any distributive princi ple or combina-
tion of princi ples that they choose;  there is no federal constitutional limitation 
on their choice. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in an Eighth Amendment 
case before the U.S. Supreme Court, “ there are a variety of legitimate peno-
logical schemes based on the theories of retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation, and the Eighth Amendment does not mandate the 
adoption of any one such scheme.”3 And, as Map 1A makes clear, states have 
exercised this right to choose in a wide variety of ways.
Desert as a Distributive Princi ple
Thirty states, designated with light shading on the map— Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mary land, Mas sa chu setts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
—-1
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6 Mapping American Criminal Law
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,  Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming4— have determined that an offender’s desert, sometimes called “retrib-
utive justice,” should serve as one of  those guiding purposes.
The princi ple is expressed in a variety of ways. Many jurisdictions hold that 
sentencing should provide “ just punishment,”5 or “deserved” punishment,6 
or simply that punishment should satisfy or do “justice.”7 Occasionally, desert 
is expressed in terms of “fairness,” as in a sentencing policy that directs courts 
to administer “fair” punishment.8 Two jurisdictions express desert in terms of 
“personal responsibility” and “accountability for one’s actions.”9 One jurisdiction 
expresses desert in terms of “merited” punishment.10 Fi nally, a host of states sim-
ply refer to “punishment” as a goal in itself,11 a reference to desert by implication. 
(This is consistent with the empirical evidence that ordinary  people think of 
“punishment” in desert terms rather than other distributive princi ple terms.12)
The remaining 21 jurisdictions, designated with medium shading on the 
map— Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West  Virginia, and 
Wisconsin13— have not set desert as a part of their guiding princi ple for deter-
mining criminal liability and punishment.
Deterrence as a Distributive Princi ple
Twenty- six states,  those with a dots overlay on the map— Alabama, Ari-
zona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 
Mas sa chu setts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas,  Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming14— have set or included deterrence 
as a guiding princi ple for their criminal code or sentencing policy. This is 
nearly always expressed by explic itly using the term “deterrence.”
Incapacitation as a Distributive Princi ple
Thirty- two jurisdictions designated with an overlay of diagonal lines on the 
map— Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mary land, Mas sa chu setts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, 
 Virginia, Washington, West  Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming15— have 
included incapacitation of the dangerous as part of their guiding princi ple. 
This princi ple is expressed in a variety of ways. Only two states— Ohio and 
 Virginia— actually use the word “incapacitation” outside of the case law. Many -1—
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Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law 7
statutes provide that sentencing should serve the purpose of “confinement,” 
when necessary to prevent further crime.16 The same sentiment is often expressed 
as “remov[ing]” dangerous offenders from society.17 Many statutes express the 
goal in terms of “protection” of the public, such as providing imprisonment 
“when required [for] public protection.”18 Incapacitation is also expressed in 
terms of punishment that targets “dangerous,” violent, or repeat offenders,  those 
whose freedom “continues to threaten public safety.”19
Rehabilitation as a Correctional Policy
Forty- two jurisdictions— Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary land, Mas-
sa chu setts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming— have  adopted rehabilitation as a general pur-
pose of their criminal code or sentencing policy. This is often expressed in 
terms of “rehabilitation”20 or “reformation,”21 but occasionally in terms of “cor-
rectional” treatment22 or simply “treatment.”23 Some statutes speak of “improve-
ment” of the offender, suggesting that punishment should “offer the offender 
an opportunity to improve himself.”24 States may be very specific about cor-
rectional programming, for instance, providing that sentences should provide 
the defendant with “educational or vocational training.”25 Fi nally, a number of 
states express rehabilitation in terms of reducing the rate of “recidivism” or the 
“risk of reoffending.”26
Although rehabilitation is a popu lar purpose, it stands in a quite dif fer ent 
position than the distributive princi ples of desert, deterrence, and incapaci-
tation discussed above (which is why it has not been included on the map). 
 There is no jurisdiction that has ever sought to use rehabilitation of the offender 
as its central princi ple in deciding who should be punished and how much. 
Rather, it is classically used not as a distributive princi ple for criminal liability 
and punishment at all but rather as a  matter of correctional policy.27 That is, no 
state sets its length of prison term according to that which  will be needed to 
rehabilitate the offender—no prison for  those who do not need rehabilitation 
or cannot be rehabilitated; and a lengthy prison sentence, even for a minor 
offense, for  those who need rehabilitation that  will take some time. But most 
states, such as the 42 explic itly mentioning rehabilitation in one form or 
another, do want to take the opportunity to rehabilitate an offender during 
what ever term of imprisonment or noncustodial control has been set by ref-
erence to one of the three primary alternative distributive princi ples of des-
ert, deterrence, or incapacitation of the dangerous. —-1
—0
—+1
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8 Mapping American Criminal Law
Restorative Justice as an Adjudicative Pro cess
A number of states have in one way or another expressed the importance 
of what some have termed “restorative justice,” which emphasizes restoring 
the offender to the community by encouraging the offender to repair broken 
relationships and satisfy debts, particularly  those caused by the criminal con-
duct. This may be expressed as “restoration,”28 “healing,”29 “restitution,”30 or 
simply “restorative justice.”31
However, restorative justice is not a distributive princi ple for criminal lia-
bility and punishment but rather an alternative adjudication and sentencing 
pro cess, one which commonly involves bringing together the offender, the vic-
tim, their  family and friends, and members of the community to decide or 
recommend an appropriate disposition of the case.  There are a  great variety of 
restorative pro cesses, some involving larger groups and some smaller groups. 
What they have in common is an open discussion, out of the glare of official 
court rules, where the entire group— some form of this pro cess is called a “sen-
tencing circle”— can try to develop an appropriate disposition that  will help 
to both reintegrate the offender and make  whole the victim.
Such restorative pro cesses can be very useful and effective, but they are 
not “distributive princi ples” for criminal liability and punishment. It is rather 
the shared judgments of justice of  those  people in the sentencing circle that 
 will shape the disposition, not any sort of articulated princi ple.32 As a practi-
cal  matter, restorative pro cesses are likely to generate results that track a princi-
ple of empirical desert: the empirical evidence is clear that ordinary  people 
think about criminal liability and punishment in desert terms,33 but nothing 
in the restorative pro cesses typically demands adherence to this or any other 
distributive princi ple.
Variations on a Desert Distributive Princi ple and Related Rules
Ordinary  people’s strong support for a desert distributive princi ple may 
be part of the explanation for why the American Law Institute (ALI) approved 
the first- ever amendment to its Model Penal Code in which it dropped the 
approach of its original 1962 draft that had encouraged states to consider a 
laundry list of distributive princi ples. The Model Penal Code was extremely 
influential and became the basis for recodifications in three- quarters of the 
states in the de cades following its promulgation. It is the original approach of 
the Model Penal Code that prob ably accounts for the range of distributive 
princi ples cited by so many jurisdictions, as represented in Map 1A. In its 
2007 amendment, however, the Model Penal Code rejects this laundry- list 
approach in  favor of a revised Section 1.02(2) that sets desert as a dominant 
distributive princi ple that can never be  violated.34-1—
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Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law 9
How do the American jurisdictions differ in their commitment to the des-
ert princi ple? As Map 1A shows, 30 of the states adopt desert as a distributive 
princi ple, although as the map also shows, many of  those states also recognize 
alternative distributive princi ples that can conflict with desert. Without des-
ignating desert as the dominant princi ple, then, desert may be sacrificed to 
promote general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous.
Map 1B shows the extent of each American jurisdiction’s commitment to 
the desert princi ple. In some instances, desert is not recognized as a distrib-
utive princi ple but some component of desert is given formal approval, such 
as requiring proportionality between the seriousness of the offense and the 
offender’s punishment. In some jurisdictions, while not committing to the dis-
tributive princi ple of desert, the authorities at least speak to the endpoint of 
the desert continuum: they expressly provide that blameless offenders  ought to 
be protected from criminal liability and punishment.
Desert Distributive Princi ples: Deontological and Empirical
Twenty states, designated with no shading on the map— Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary land, Mississippi, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,  Virginia, and Wyoming35— have determined 
that desert is a guiding purpose of the criminal code or sentencing policy.
Ten other states, shown with no shading but an overlay of dots— Alabama, 
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Mas sa chu setts, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Washington36— similarly adopt desert as a distrib-
utive princi ple but specifically refer to desert as reflected in shared judgments 
of the community. As noted above, this has been referred to as “empirical des-
ert” in order to distinguish it from the notion of “deontological desert” derived 
from moral philosophy. Empirical desert is most reliably based on the research 
of social psychologists who seek to determine the governing princi ples that 
ordinary  people have in their heads and use in determining their judgments of 
justice, as compared to deontological desert, which is derived from logical 
reasoning, classically by moral phi los o phers. (Empirical research has shown 
that  there is an enormous amount of agreement on basic princi ples of justice 
across demographics, at least with regard to the core of wrongdoing.37)
A jurisdiction’s adoption of empirical desert as a distributive princi ple is 
expressed in a number of ways. Some codes state that punishment is the pub-
lic’s “condemnation” of, or its “appropriate response” to, the offender’s con-
duct.38 Sometimes empirical desert is expressed in terms of holding the 
offender “accountable” to the community39 or of vindicating public norms.40 
Some jurisdictions simply state that punishment  ought to “promote re spect for 
the law.”41 —-1
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Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law 11
The remaining 21 jurisdictions do not openly recognize desert as a distrib-
utive princi ple. However, most of them at least recognize some component 
of desert— that is, recognize  either a princi ple of proportionality between the 
seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the punishment, or make some 
effort to protect the blameless from criminal liability and punishment, or both.
The Princi ple of Full Offense Proportionality
Seven states, shown with light shading on the map— Delaware, Indiana, 
Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, and West  Virginia42—do not 
include justice or desert as a guiding princi ple. However, they have  adopted a 
princi ple of proportionality between the seriousness of the punishment and the 
seriousness of the offense. (A desert distributive princi ple would go further and 
would take into account not just the seriousness of the offense harm but also the 
offender’s culpability, excuses, and mitigations. In other words, a desert princi-
ple would require proportionality between not just the offense harm but the 
overall blameworthiness of the offender and the seriousness of the punishment.)
A common way of expressing the adoption of such an offense proportion-
ality requirement is to call for punishment to “differentiate” between “serious 
and minor offenses,”43 or that punishment be “proportioned”44 or “commen-
surate”45 with the nature or harm of the offense.
Full Offense Proportionality Plus Protecting the Blameless
Four states, designated with light shading and an overlay of diagonal 
lines— Florida, Montana, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania46—go beyond an 
offense proportionality rule to also specifically adopt a provision that a blame-
less person should be exempt from punishment. Such a provision only adopts 
the endpoint of the desert princi ple: it protects the blameless from punishment 
but does not require that the extent of punishment should other wise track 
the extent of an offender’s blameworthiness.
States in this category commonly “limit the condemnation of conduct as 
criminal when it is without fault”47 or “safeguard conduct that is without fault 
from being condemned as criminal.”48 Although the states in this group fall 
short of a full desert princi ple, they do better in approximating desert than any 
other nondesert group.
A Partial Offense Proportionality Princi ple
Four jurisdictions, shown with medium shading on the map— District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Nevada, and Utah49— have  adopted a weaker form of the 
offense proportionality rule, stating that punishment simply  ought to take 
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account of the “seriousness,”50 “severity,”51 or “gravity”52 of the offense.53 That 
is, the directive is satisfied simply by taking account of the offense serious-
ness in some way; it does not require that the punishment be proportionate 
to the offense seriousness.
Partial Offense Proportionality Plus Protecting Blameless
One state, Illinois, with medium shading on the map plus an overlay of diag-
onal lines, has  adopted a partial offense proportionality rule54 and a provision 
that the system  ought to avoid punishing blameless offenders.55 By explic itly 
providing for the protection of blameless persons, Illinois does better than the 
group immediately above but still leaves itself far away from a desert princi ple.
No Proportionality and No Protection of the Blameless
Five states, designated with black shading on the map— Iowa, Kansas, Min-
nesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin56— have not  adopted desert, justice, offense 
proportionality, or even protection of the blameless as a distributive princi ple.
Observations and Speculations
It seems clear from the maps above that most jurisdictions have not yet 
caught up with the ALI’s adoption, in its 2007 amendment to the Model Penal 
Code, of desert as the inviolate distributive princi ple. Why this gap between 
the historically influential ALI and current authorities in the states?
Part of the responsibility no doubt falls on the ALI itself. From its initial 
promulgation in 1962  until its amendment in 2007, even the Model Penal 
Code urged states to adopt a laundry list of alternative distributive princi ples 
that allowed code and sentencing guideline draf ters and individual sentencing 
judges to sacrifice just deserts to promote other distributive princi ples, typically 
crime control through general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous.
But the intervening years have revealed much about the limitations of deter-
rence and incapacitation princi ples, as well as revealing the crime control 
benefits of a criminal law that promotes justice rather than sacrifices it to 
deterrent and incapacitation goals.  There is an enormous lit er a ture on the sub-
ject, but some of the key findings might be summarized this way.57
Generally, deterrence has the potential to be an enormously efficient crime 
control mechanism. By punishing a single offender, one can send a deterrent 
threat to hundreds or even thousands of potential offenders that could be just 
the  thing to change their mind about committing a contemplated offense. Gen-
eral deterrence does work at least in the sense that having a criminal justice 
system that imposes punishment for violations is likely to have an effect on 
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 people’s decisions to commit crimes. What does not work is using general 
deterrence to formulate criminal law and sentencing rules— that is, to use it 
as a distributive princi ple for criminal liability and punishment, such as to 
decide  whether to provide an insanity defense,  whether to grade attempts the 
same as the substantive offense, or hundreds of other specific criminal code 
or sentencing decisions.
For general deterrence to work effectively as a distributive princi ple, at least 
three conditions must be pres ent. First, the intended target must know about 
the deterrence- based rule— the treatment of the insanity defense and the grad-
ing attempts. But the real ity is that the target audience rarely knows the law. 
Second, even if they do know the law, the target audience must be rational 
calculators who  will take that information into account and alter their con-
duct to most effectively promote their own interests. Yet, the real ity is that 
most in the target audience are commonly highly irrational in their thinking 
 because of the influence of drugs, alcoholism, impulsiveness,  mental or emo-
tional disturbance, or a host of other  factors. Fi nally, even if the target audience 
knows the law and are rational calculators, they  will not be deterred by 
the threat of criminal punishment  unless their calculations lead them to con-
clude that the costs of the contemplated offense outweigh the benefits. Yet 
the conviction and punishment rates are so low and the threatened punish-
ment so remote that, in comparison to the immediate benefit of the contem-
plated offense— such as a robbery that  will produce the money to immediately 
buy drugs— the target audience is more likely to conclude that the benefits of 
the offense outweigh the costs.58
Making a general deterrence distributive princi ple even less attractive is 
the fact that  there is already a general deterrent effect in the punishment threat-
ened by a desert distributive princi ple. If a deterrence- based princi ple is to 
provide significantly greater deterrent effect, it can do so only by means of devi-
ating from desert, as in  doing injustice, which the empirical desert research shows 
can incrementally undercut effective crime control. Thus, even if one could gain 
some greater deterrent effect by  doing injustice, which may be a rare oppor-
tunity, even that greater deterrent effect may be outweighed by the system’s loss 
of crime control effectiveness that comes from its loss of moral credibility with 
the community.
In contrast, an incapacitation distributive princi ple does in fact work. Put-
ting an offender in prison, for example,  will prevent the offender from com-
mitting other offenses—at least against persons not in prison. The prob lem, 
however, is that clinicians have a limited ability to reliably predict who  will 
in fact be dangerous in the  future. Making  things worse, the “criminal jus-
tice” system seems to feel obliged to look like it is  doing justice for past offenses 
rather openly admitting that it is a preventive detention system whose only 
focus is  future offenses. Thus, it tends to cloak its preventive detention to look 
like criminal justice by focusing not so openly on clinical assessments of  future 
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dangerousness but instead on  factors like past criminal rec ord. In most sentenc-
ing guidelines, for example, an offender’s prior criminal history may count for 
much more of the resulting sentence than the offense actually committed, on 
a theory that past criminality predicts  future criminality. Unfortunately, that 
focus further weakens the accuracy of the  future dangerousness prediction. 
The ultimate effect is seriously high false- positive rates— predictions of  future 
dangerousness that are in fact false— that have the effect of wasting correctional 
expenditures and unjustifiably intruding in the lives of the detainees.59
At the same time, empirical studies have suggested that  there is not just a 
deontological virtue in following a desert distributive princi ple— doing jus-
tice is good in itself that requires no other justification— but also that it has a 
significant crime control benefit. Criminal justice systems that are seen as reg-
ularly  doing injustice or regularly failing to do justice, especially when  these 
deviations from desert are predictable results of the system’s criminal law 
rules, are systems that are likely to provoke subversion and re sis tance. In con-
trast, a criminal justice system that earns a reputation as being devoted to 
 doing justice above all else—to giving  people the punishment they deserve, 
no more and no less—is a system that is likely to inspire greater cooperation, 
acquiescence, and deference. And, perhaps most importantly, a system that 
has earned a reputation for moral credibility—as being a reliable authority of 
what is and is not truly condemnable—is a system that is more likely to lead 
 people to internalize its norms. It is also a system that has the power of its 
moral credibility to help shift community norms when needed.60
Notice that  these crime control benefits of a desert distribution flow not 
from a distributive princi ple of deontological desert derived from the reason-
ing of moral phi los o phers. Instead, the crime control benefits of a desert dis-
tribution flow from criminal law building moral credibility with the community, 
primarily by setting criminal liability and punishment distributive rules that 
track the shared judgments of justice of ordinary  people.61 As noted earlier, 
this “empirical desert” is recognized as a distributive princi ple only in 10 
states. And even then, most of  those states allow other distributive princi ples 
to be promoted at the expense of empirical desert.
Although the case for desert as the dominant distributive princi ple is 
strengthening, it  will no doubt take a long time for  these truths to percolate 
down into the po liti cal conversations that influence the formulation of the 
distributive princi ples that govern criminal codes, sentencing guidelines, and 
the calculations of individual sentencing judges.
Notes
 1. For a more detailed discussion of how  these alternative distributive princi-
ples differ, see Paul  H. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law: Who 
Should Be Punished How Much? at 7–20 (Oxford 2008).
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 2. Ala. Code § 13A-1-3; Ala. Code § 12-25-2; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.100; 
Alaska Const. art. I, § 12; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-101; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 13-101.01; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801; Cal. Penal Code § 1170; Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-1-102; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-102.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 54-300; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 201; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 6502; D.C. 
Code Ann. § 3-101; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.012; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-1-2; Haw. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 706-606; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2521; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/1-2; Ind. Const. art. I, § 18; Ind. Const. art. I, § 16; Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5; 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6601; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.007; La. Stat. Ann. § 15:321; 
Me. Const. art. I, § 9; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17- A, § 1151; Md. Code Ann., Crim. 
Proc. § 6-202; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 211E, § 2; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 769.33a; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.01; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 364.01; Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 558.019; Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission— Purpose and Goals, Missouri 
Sentencing Advisory Commission (last accessed Sept. 13, 2017), http:// www 
. mosac . mo . gov / page . jsp ? id = 45401 (stating that official purpose of sentencing 
commission is to ensure “proportionality of punishment”); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 45-1-102; Mont. Const. art. II, § 28; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-102; Neb. Const. 
art. I, § 15; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § SB 451, § 6; N.H. Const. Pt. 1, art. XVIII; N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:61- a; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-2; N.Y. Penal Law § 1.05; N.C. 
Const. art. XI, § 2; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 164-42.1; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 164-
41; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1-01-02; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.11; Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 181.24; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 234; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, 
§ 1514; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 161.025; Or. Const. art. I, § 15; 18 Pa. Stat. and 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 104; R.I. Const. art. I, § 8; 12 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-19.3-
1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-101; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102; Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 40-35-103; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.02; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104; Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 7030; Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-801; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 9A.04.020; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.010; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5; State 
v. Broughton, 196 W. Va. 281, 292, 470 S.E.2d 413, 424 (1996) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted) (interpreting the constitutional requirement of 
proportionality to include incapacitation); Wyo. Const. art. I, § 15; Bear Cloud 
v. State, 2012 WY 16, ¶ 63, 275 P.3d 377, 402 (stating that the four legitimate 
goals of penal sanctions are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabili-
tation). Five states— Mississippi, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
and Wisconsin— have not codified general purposes as to criminal law or sen-
tencing,  either by statute, commission policy, or constitutional provision. For 
 these jurisdictions, court decisions guide sentencing policy. See Taggart v. State, 
957 So. 2d 981, 994 (Miss. 2007) (adopting princi ples of rehabilitation, retribu-
tion, “separation from society,” and deterrence); State v. Kirby, 2003- NMCA-074, 
¶ 28, 133 N.M. 782, 789, 70 P.3d 772, 779 (“[T]he traditional aims of punish-
ment [are] retribution and deterrence.”); State v. Jones, 2010- NMSC-012, ¶ 35, 
148 N.M. 1, 10, 229 P.3d 474, 483 (“[U]nlike the adult criminal justice system, 
with its focus on punishment and deterrence, the juvenile justice system reflects 
a policy favoring the rehabilitation and treatment of  children.”); State v. Tucker, 
324 S.C. 155, 174, 478 S.E.2d 260, 270 (1996) (recognizing incapacitation and 
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rehabilitation as proper goals of sentencing); State v. Fletcher, 322 S.C. 256, 260, 
471  S.E.2d 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing “punishment” per se as a 
proper goal of sentencing); State v. Talla, 2017 S.D. 34, ¶ 14, 897 N.W.2d 351, 
355 (stating that retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are 
legitimate penological goals); State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 416, 565 N.W.2d 
506, 514 (1997) (holding that the primary considerations in assigning punish-
ment are the offender’s rehabilitative needs and the interests of deterrence and 
incapacitation).
 3. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2683, 115 
L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
 4. See supra note 2.
 5. Alabama (“just and adequate punishment”), Arizona (“just and deserved 
punishment”), Connecticut (“ just punishment”), Hawaii (“ just punishment”), 
Mas sa chu setts (“punish the offender justly” and “provide just punishment”), 
 Virginia (“just criminal penalties”), and Washington (“punishment which is just”). 
See supra note 1.
 6. Arizona (“ just and deserved punishment”), Colorado (“a sentence [the 
offender] deserves”), and Tennessee (“justly deserved”). See supra note 2.
 7. North Carolina (“satisfy justice”), Oklahoma (do “ justice”), and Rhode 
Island (“do justice to the victim [and] the offender”). See supra note 2.
 8. Connecticut (“fair, just, and equitable”) and Mary land (“fair and propor-
tional”). See supra note 1.
 9. Oregon (“personal responsibility, accountability for one’s actions”) and Ken-
tucky (“hold offenders accountable”). See supra note 2.
10. North Dakota (“merited punishment”). See supra note 2.
11. California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas. See 
supra note 2.
12. See Paul H. Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, Part I (The 
Nature of Judgments about Justice) (Oxford 2013); Robinson, Distributive Princi-
ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapters 7 and 8.
13. See supra note 2.
14. See supra note 2.
15. See supra note 2.
16. Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, and Oregon. See supra note 1.
17. Arizona (“remove from society persons whose conduct continues to threaten 
public safety”), Arkansas (“protect the public by restraining offenders”), and Ten-
nessee (“[restrain] repeat offenders”). See supra note 1.
18. Alabama, Colorado (“provide [punishment] when required in the inter-
ests of public protection”), Hawaii, Iowa, Mas sa chu setts, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma 
(“incarceration [is] a punishment and . . .  a means of protecting the public”), and 
Vermont (courts should consider “the risk to self,  others, and the community at 
large presented by the defendant”). See supra note 2.
19. District of Columbia (punish with “due regard for the . . .  dangerous-
ness of the offender”), Hawaii (“protect the public from further crimes of the 
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defendant”), Idaho (imprisonment imposed when  there is an “undue risk [that] 
defendant  will commit another crime”), Iowa (“protection of the community from 
further offenses by the defendant and  others”), Kansas (goal “that dangerous 
offenders  shall be correctively treated in custody for long terms as needed”), Mary-
land (imprisonment for “violent” or “ career” criminals), Mas sa chu setts (“protect 
the public from further crimes of the defendant”), Nebraska (“subject to public 
control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit 
crimes”), Nevada (target offenders with “predatory or violent nature,” who “must 
receive sentences which reflect the need to ensure the safety and protection of 
the public”), New Jersey (“subject to public control persons whose conduct indi-
cates that they are disposed to commit offenses”), Ohio (“protect the public from 
 future crime by the offender”), Tennessee (“[restrain] repeat offenders”),  Virginia 
(“due regard . . .  to the dangerousness of the offender”), and Washington (“reduce 
the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community”). See supra note 2.
20. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas (“rehabilitation and restoration to the com-
munity”), California, Colorado, Connecticut (“rehabilitation and reintegration”), 
Delaware (“rehabilitation and restoration [as] useful, law- abiding citizens within 
the community”), District of Columbia, Florida (“opportunity for rehabilitation”), 
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina 
(“rehabilitation and restoration”), South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wis-
consin (address “rehabilitative needs”). See supra note 2.
21. Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, and Wyo-
ming. See supra note 1.
22. Hawaii (“correctional treatment”), Idaho (“correctional treatment”), Kan-
sas (“[corrective] treat[ment]”), and Mary land (“[correction] options . . .  for appro-
priate criminals”). See supra note 1.
23. Vermont. See supra note 2.
24. Kentucky (“improv[e] outcomes for . . .  offenders”) and Washington (“offer 
the offender an opportunity to improve himself or herself”).
25. Hawaii (“provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment”) and Mas sa chu setts (“pro-
vide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training”). See supra 
note 2.
26. Kentucky (“reduc[e] recidivism and criminal be hav ior”) and Washing-
ton (“reduce the risk of reoffending by offenders in the community”). See supra 
note 2.
27. See generally Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, 
Chapter 5 (Rehabilitation).
28. Arkansas, Colorado, and Delaware. See supra note 2.
29. Colorado. See supra note 2.
30. For instance, Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Mas sa chu setts, Missouri, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Tennessee have all incorporated restitution into their general purposes statutes. 
See supra note 2.
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31. California, Colorado, and Missouri. See supra note 2.
32. See generally Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, 
Chapter 9 (Restorative Justice).
33. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, Part I (The Nature of 
Judgments about Justice) (Oxford 2013); Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Crim-
inal Law, supra note 1, Chapters 7 and 8.
34. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, 
Chapter 11.B.
35. See supra note 2.
36. See supra note 2.
37. See Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and Utility of Desert, supra note 1, Chap-
ters 1 and 2.
38. Alaska (“community[’s] condemnation of the offender”), New Jersey (“con-
demn conduct [that hurts the] public interests”) and New York (“provide appro-
priate public response to par tic u lar offenses”). See supra note 2.
39. Connecticut (“[hold] the offender accountable to the community”). See 
supra note 2.
40. North Dakota (“ensure the public safety . . .  through the vindication of public 
norms by the imposition of merited punishment”) and Oklahoma (“demonstrate . . . 
that the offender’s conduct is unacceptable to society”). See supra note 2.
41. Alabama, Hawaii, Mas sa chu setts, and Washington. See supra note 2.
42. See supra note 2.
43. Delaware. See supra note 1. This formulation is also  adopted by a number 
of desert jurisdictions, including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See supra 
note 2. But the breadth of the desert princi ple makes up for the limitations of the 
proportionality princi ple by itself.
44. Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, and West  Virginia. 
See supra note 2. This formulation is also  adopted by some desert jurisdictions, 
including Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mary land, Nebraska, New York, Rhode 
Island, and Washington. See supra note 2. But the breadth of the desert princi ple 
makes up for the limitations of the proportionality princi ple by itself.
45. This princi ple is  adopted by Arkansas, a desert jurisdiction. Arkansas pol-
icy is that punishment  ought to be “commensurate” with the nature of the 
offense, “taking into account  factors that may diminish or increase an offender’s 
culpability.” See supra note 1. But the breadth of the desert princi ple makes up 
for the limitations of the proportionality princi ple by itself.
46. See supra note 2.
47. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Illinois have  adopted the formulation, 
though none of the four full proportionality states have  adopted it. See supra note 2.
48. Florida (“safeguard conduct that is without fault . . .  from being condemned 
as criminal”); Montana (“safeguard conduct that is without fault from condem-
nation as criminal”); Nebraska (“safeguard conduct that is without fault and which 
is essentially victimless in its effect from condemnation as criminal”); Pennsyl-
vania (“safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”). 
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See supra note 2. Some desert states have also  adopted a similar provision: North 
Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See supra note 2.
49. See supra note 2.
50. The District of Columbia (“due regard for the . . .  seriousness of the 
offense”), Georgia (“prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the serious-
ness of the crimes”), Illinois (“prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the 
seriousness of offenses”), and Utah (“proportionate to the seriousness of [the] 
[offense]”) use this language. See supra note 2. A number of desert and full pro-
portionality jurisdictions use the language of seriousness: California, Connecti-
cut, Hawaii, Idaho, Mas sa chu setts, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas,  Virginia, and Washington. See supra note 2.
51. Nevada (“[impose] sentences that increase in direct proportion to the sever-
ity of [the] crimes and [the] histories of criminality”). See supra note 2.
52. One full proportionality jurisdiction has also  adopted this partial propor-
tionality formulation: Maine (“[impose] sentences that do not diminish the grav-
ity of offenses”). See supra note 2.
53. Note that one full proportionality jurisdiction— Pennsylvania— has also 
 adopted a kind of partial proportionality provision, with a purpose to “safeguard 
offenders against excessive, disproportionate[,] or arbitrary punishment.” See 
supra note 2.
54. See supra note 47.
55. Illinois (“limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is with-
out fault”). See supra note 2.
56. See supra note 2.
57. See generally Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1.
58. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapters 
3 and 4.
59. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 6.
60. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 7.
61. Robinson, Distributive Princi ples of Criminal Law, supra note 1, Chapter 8.
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